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The Young Victim as Witness for the
Prosecution: Another Form of Abuse?
I. Introduction
annie died the other day
never was there such a lay -
whom, among her dollies, dad
first ("don't tell you mother") had;
making annie slightly mad
but very wonderful in bed
- saint and satyrs, go your way
youths and maidens: let us pray.'
The existence of brutal sexual misuse of children cannot be
doubted.2 Stories emanating from Pennsylvania alone chronical a
tragic history of children abused and their abusers left unpunished.
For example, in Dauphin County, Pennsylvania, doctors discovered a
three-year old boy afflicted with gonorrhea of the mouth, penis, and
rectum. The child, too terrified to speak, could not provide compe-
tent testimony at trial, forcing the prosecution to drop the case.'
Similarly, in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, an external medical ex-
amination of an eight-year old child revealed a red rash along the
inner surface of her thighs and a yellow-greenish discharge from her
vagina. Test results indicated gonorrhea. Eleven days later, when the
excruciating pain had sufficiently subsided to permit an internal ex-
amination, doctors noted an absence of the hymen and an abnor-
mally large vaginal opening. The child had been raped twice, by a
neighbor who cared for her on a routine basis." Likewise, in Phila-
delphia, Pennsylvania, a two-year old infant was snatched from her
crib and raped. Subsequently, her throat was slit and she was left in
an alley to die.' Finally, in Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, three
1. E.E. CUMMINGS, COLLECTED POEMS 45 (1963).
2. See infra notes 3-13 and accompanying text. Sexual misuse of a child has been
defined as the exposure of a child to sexual stimulation inappropriate for the child's age, level
of psychosocial development, and role in the family. Brant & Tisza, The Sexually Misused
Child, AM. J. ORTHOPSYCNIATRY 80, 81 (Jan. 1977).
3. Interview with official from Dauphin County Deputy District Attorney (Sept. 24,
1984).
4. Id.
5. Philadelphia Inquirer, Aug. 16, 1984, at B8, col. 3.
brothers, all under the age of six, were sexually assaulted by their
father. The court held the brothers incompetent to testify in a crimi-
nal proceeding because of their immaturity. Consequently, the chil-
dren remain in their father's custody and care.'
Unfortunately, the outrage of child sexual abuse in Pennsylva-
nia is far from unique. The problem confronts every community,
city, and state in the nation. No economic class, race or nationality
is immune.7 The presumption of moral integrity traditionally af-
forded certain institutions - such as church groups, nursery schools,
and scouting organizations - has been severely weakened in the
face of recurrent child abuse in their midst. Sexual child abuse oc-
curs within the family. It occurs within schools, 8 churches, 9 foster
homes, 10 youth organizations," military academies,12 and day care
centers.1
3
Sensational disclosures of horrid details of sexual abuse of chil-
dren, as well as the growing conviction that children possess enforce-
able legal rights, have hurled sexual abuse of children into national
prominence. Parents who must entrust their children to others dur-
ing work hours demand measures to eliminate the problem, but find
6. Interview with official of Cumberland County Children and Youth Services (Sept.
10, 1984).
7. U.S. DEPT. HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 7-8
(1974-1975).
8. A popular teacher at Glenbrook North High School, was arrested on charges of
kidnapping, murder, and deviate sexual assault. He was accused of abducting a 17-year old
boy and binding, gagging, and sexually assaulting him before the boy died. C. LINDECKER,
CHILDREN IN CHAINS 104 (1981). In Daytona Beach, California, a former student gave police
37 typewritten pages of sworn testimony detailing orgies, beatings, and submission to anal
intercourse with a school principle. Id. at 85.
9. In Alto, Tennessee, an Episcopalian priest established and maintained a home for
boys. Investigators uncovered more than 1,000 photographs of nude boys and adults engaging
in homosexual acts. The priest, as well as adult patrons of the home, appeared in some of the
photographs. The patrons were identified and traced to 12 states. Id. at 54.
10. Scotty Baker had been placed in foster homes in Dade County, Florida. Regular
sexual assaults by his various foster fathers - initially forced upon him - became a way of
life. When Scotty became a key witness in police attempts to uncover sex crimes against chil-
dren, results of the years of trauma emerged. Scotty stripped the insulation from an extension
cord, taped the wire to his chest, and plugged it into the wall socket. Id. at 81.
II. In Illinois, a boy scoutmaster and his assistant were arrested and charged with
taking indecent liberties with an I l-year old boy while on a camping trip. In Massachusetts,
two scout leaders were charged with rape and other sex offenses against boys ranging from II
to 14 years. Id. at 84-85.
12. In October, 1984, the "granite ramparts of the United States Military Academy
[at West Point], the nation's oldest military post and the villages in its shadow have been
rocked by charges that children were sexually and physically abused at a day care center on its
grounds." When their three-year old daughter began to scream when she tried to urinate, an
enlisted man and his wife rushed her to the hospital, where she was treated for vaginal bleed-
ing. The child indicated that her teacher had inserted a pen into her vagina. Philadelphia
Inquirer, Oct. 18, 1984, at A2, col. 1.
13. Authorities charge that for at least ten years, more than 100 children have been
sexually victimized at a prestigious California preschool. The children were fondled,
sodomized, and raped. Some may have participated in pornography and prostitution. A Hidden
Epidemic, NEWSWEEK, May 14, 1984, at 33.
no quick solutions forthcoming. Sexual abuse of children presents
formidable and complex issues. One particularly troublesome area
concerns the child's role, not only as a victim, but also as the prose-
cution's witness at trial.
This comment discusses difficulties encountered when a trial
witness is a sexually victimized child. 14 It examines proposed Penn-
sylvania legislation intended to remedy disparate treatment of chil-
dren within the judicial system. Finally, it addresses remaining ques-
tions and recommends future action.
II. Background
When children appear in court as witnesses, attorneys and
judges confront the same problem-is the child competent to testify?
Only when the court resolves this question affirmatively may the wit-
ness take the stand. The standards by which judges determine com-
petency, however, vary among jurisdictions.
In Pennsylvania, the law presumes that every witness is compe-
tent to testify in criminal proceedings.' 5 While under Pennsylvania
law no particular age dispositively indicates incapacity to testify,16
opposing counsel may attack the child witness' competency through
trial objections. The objecting party carries the burden of proving
incompetency." However, courts have not dogmatically enforced the
statutory presumption of competency. In practice, when the witness
is less than fourteen years old, the trial judge must conduct a thor-
14. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6302 (Purdon 1982) defines "child" as an individual
who:
(I) is under 18 years of age
(2) is under the age of 21 years who committed an act of delinquency
before reaching 18 years
(3) was adjudicated dependent before reaching 18 years and who, while
engaged in a course of instruction or treatment, requests the court to retain ju-
risdiction until the course has been complete, but in no event . past the age of
21 years.
This Comment primarily addresses the legal problems that arise and possible remedies to
those problems when the child witness is under 14 years of age. The Comment discusses these
issues solely in the context of criminal court proceedings.
15. 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 5911 (Purdon 1982). This statute provides in pertinent
part that "all persons shall be fully competent to testify in a criminal proceeding."
16. Rosche v. McCoy, 397 Pa. 615, 620-21, 156 A.2d 307, 310 (1959). In this automo-
bile accident case, a seven-year old girl planned to testify about events she witnessed when she
was four years old. The trial judge conducted an extensive inquiry and concluded that the
witness was incompetent. He based his conclusion on the fact that her testimony required that
the young witness understand the implications of what she observed at the time it occurred.
17. Commonwealth v. Short, 278 Pa. Super. 581, 586, 420 A.2d 694, 696 (1980). The
defendant was charged with rape, deviate sexual intercourse, and aggravated assault. The
nine-year old victim replied to questions about the nature of truth and the obligation of the
oath with terse yes and no answers. Although she was unable to give an example of lying and
was unfamiliar with the concept of divine retribution, the trial court qualified the child as a
competent witness. In upholding the trial court's decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
noted that the child knew the meaning of truth and was cognizant of the possibility of punish-
ment for telling falsehoods.
ough inquiry to establish the mental capacity of the witness.'8 In the
seminal case of Rosche v. McCoy,19 the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court enunciated criteria for assessing a child's testimonial capacity.
The court held that, first, the child must be able to observe and re-
call the occurrence about which he will testify; second, the child
must be able to communicate, by both understanding the questions
and framing intelligent answers; and, third, the child must be con-
scious of a duty to speak truthfully.2"
The first requirement for establishing competency necessitates
that the child possess adequate cognitive and memory 1 skills to
comprehend and remember the occurrence without prompting.
While the law assumes that a child's memory is inferior to an adult's
and subject to greater distortion,2" at least one commentator has sug-
18. Id. at 586, 420 A.2d at 696-97. See also Commonwealth v. Fultz, - Pa. Super.
-... 462 A.2d 1340, 1343 (1983).
19. Rosche v. McCoy, 397 Pa. 615, 156 A.2d 307 (1959).
20. Id. at 620-21, 156 A.2d at 310.
21. The human memory performs at least two functions: the storage of experience for a
period of time and the retrieval of that information. Historically, psychologists contended that
memory recorded all perceived events with equal strength. This meant that when a person
could not remember something, the deficiency stemmed from his ability to recall, rather than
from initially poor storage. However, current psychological theory maintains that memory in-
volves two distinct and distiniguishable processes: short term memory and long term memory.
When a person perceives an event, short term memory renders the input information available
for a maximum of 30 seconds. Special effort must be employed to transfer short term memory
to long term memory. In the absence of such effort, the perception may be lost forever. The
child's memory skills are often assessed by asking him to recall what he saw or heard or by
asking him to recognize the source of his perception. To recall an event, the child is required to
reclaim all essential information without prompting or assistance.
Recognition of an event is less demanding. In testing recognition, a child is presented with
familiar and unfamiliar information. He must select only the familiar information. Both chil-
dren and adults perform better when asked to recognize an event as compared to recalling it.
The difference between recall and recognition memory, however, is more pronounced in young
children than in older children. If a five-year old child is shown 12 pictures and asked to recall
or recognize them, he will typically recall four but recognize all 12. His recall memory is much
poorer than his recognition memory.
The child's recall memory is also weaker than that of an adolescent or adult. Because the
young child does not possess an adequate set of cognitive units - such as images, symbols,
concepts, and rules - with which to label information, he often is unable to name an event.
Naming an event requires increased attention, which in turn facilitates the occurrence's stor-
age in memory longer.
Additionally, a child does not spontaneously repeat events to himself in order to aid their
storage; nor does he actively try to retain material. The child may still be uninterested in
remembering the details of his life.
Different functions of memory also exist between adults and within individuals, depending
on the circumstances under which the subject attempts to recall events. Memory, which con-
tinually reorganizes segments of knowledge into more meaningful systems, is the most elusive,
yet one of the most central thought processes. Its capacity for storing information is undisput-
edly enormous, but it is fragile and vulnerable to even slight interferences, such as anxiety,
distraction, and fatigue. Anxiety influences memory by interfering with focused attention,
while motivation affects the quality of memory. DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY TODAY 264 (J.
Aronfreed ed. 1974).
22. Cohen & Harnick, The Susceptibility of the Child Witness to Suggestion, 4 LAW
& HUMAN BEHAVIOR 201, 201-02 (1980). This article discusses the reliability of child wit-
nesses and concludes that because of their suggestibility, child witnesses should be treated with
suspicion. The article reports the results of an experiment in which researchers compared 3rd
gested that a child's memory may not be any more problematic,
when recollection is stimulated by direct questions. 3 Research data,
however, on children's memory and recollection over long periods of
time remains inconclusive. 24 Additionally, great stress may compro-
mise a child's memory skills. 2 5 Even when the child's memory skills
are adequately developed, his testimony may be of questionable
value if his imagination blends fact and fantasy. The child must be
able to organize his experience intellectually and distinguish it from
thoughts and fantasies. 6 A young child may have difficulty, how-
ever, conceptualizing complicated events and ordering them in space
and time.2 7 This handicap may render the child ill-suited to present
a cogent analysis of witnessed events.
2 8
The second requirement for establishing competency relates to a
child's basic intelligence and his use of language. Generally, a young
child's verbal skills are not sufficiently developed to enable proficient
articulation of his thoughts in adult terminology. Often the child
does not understand meanings of words used by adults, and questions
asked by counsel seem bewildering and senseless.29
grade, 6th grade, and college students on their ability to recall events from a film. The recall
ability was tested by asking the subjects leading and suggestive questions. The data indicated
that the 6th graders performed as well as college students in memory capacity and ability to
resist suggestions. Third graders were inferior in this area to 6th graders. However, even under
confusing conditions, the 3rd grade children gave correct responses to 51% of the non-sugges-
tive questions. This rose to 76% correct on non-suggestive questions after a second session.
While the latter performance yielded statistics lower than the 87.5% correct scored by college
students, it nevertheless indicates that the 3rd grade children retained correct information.
Authors Cohen and Harnick contend that the onus rests upon legal machinery to adopt inter-
rogation procedures, both inside the courtroom and outside, which will elicit this information
with minimal distortion.
23. Melton, Children's Competency to Testify, 5 LAW & HUMAN BEHAVIOR 73
(1981).
24. Id. at 77.
25. See, cf., Id.
26. Stafford, The Child As Witness, 37 WASH. L. REV. 303, 304 (1972).
27. Melton, supra note 23, at 78. The author suggests, however, that a young child's
difficulty in conceptualizing complex events may not be as significant as it first appears. Mel-
ton suggests that if jurors can ascertain facts from a child's subjective account, the significant
of the child's immaturity diminishes. Additionally, a child's inability to fully comprehend a
situation may not render him incapable of the level of observation required by law. Id. at 78.
28. Id. at 77. Piaget, an eminent Swiss psychologist who developed theories of cognitive
development, observed three stages in the development of time concepts. In the first stage, four
and five-year old children define time in terms of spatial stopping points of objects. The object
that stops further ahead is perceived as having travelled faster, longer, and further. During the
second stage, the child begins to consider other factors, such as starting points. The child's
mastery of this concept is perfected in the third stage, generally at the age of seven or eight
years.
29. Stafford, supra note 26, at 314. Under a normal pattern of vocalization develop-
ment, an 18-month old child knows ten words and uses phrases composed of adjectives and
nouns. At two years old, the child's vocabulary includes about 300 words. The child can use
pronouns and name familiar objects. He can tell about his experiences. By the time the child
reaches three years old, he has a vocabulary of 900 words, and talks in sentences. The child
does not appear to care whether others listen. He uses plurals and defines objects in terms of
their use. The vocabulary of a five-year old child includes approximately 2,100 words. He talks
constantly and asks questions about the meanings of words. The six-year old has command of
The third requirement for establishing competency encompasses
a child's sense of moral duty. The competency of the child witness is
challenged most frequently on this ground. Pennsylvania courts do
not require that the child witness understand the dictionary defini-
tion of the oath. Rather, it is sufficient that the child demonstrate an
ability to differentiate between truth and falsehood, appreciate the
duty to tell the truth, and recognize the inevitability of punishment
as a consequence of false statements.3 0
When a child's competency to testify is questioned, the trial
judge may conduct a voir dire examination. Pennsylvania courts con-
sistently hold that determination of competency is within the sound
discretion of the trial judge8 and will not be reversed on review in
the absence of clear, flagrant abuse.32 Professors Wigmore and Mc-
Cormick recommend that such determinations never be disturbed."3
Both commentators contend that the requirement of establishing
competency be abolished and a child of any age be permitted to tes-
tify. The trier of fact then would determine the weight and credibil-
ity of the testimony aided by cautionary instructions from the trial
court.3"
practically every sentence structure, and asks questions which show thought. MARLOW, TEXT-
BOOK OF PEDIATRIC NURSING 434, 534, 607 (1973).
30. See Commonwealth v. Penn, 497 Pa. 232, 240-41, 439 A.2d 1154, 1158-59 (1982)
cert. denied, 456 U.S. 980 (1983) (court permitted 12-year old child to testify despite lack of
understanding of the word oath); Commonwealth v. Riley, 458 Pa. 390, 394, 326 A.2d 384,
385-86 (1974) (six-year old witness stated that he would "go to the devil" if he lied); Com-
monwealth v. Fox, 445 Pa. 76, 81, 282 A.2d 341, 344 (1971) (court permitted eight-year old
child to testify after she stated that she would "be in trouble" is she didn't tell the truth);
Commonwealth v. Romanoff, 258 Pa. Super. 452, 459, 392 A.2d 881, 884 (1978) (court al-
lowed eight-year old witness to testify after he stated that to tell a lie "would be a sin");
Commonwealth v. Payton, 258 Pa. Super. 140, 143-46, 392 A.2d 723, 724-25, (1978) (court
permitted six-year old child to testify after she stated that her mother would punish her if she
told a lie); Commonwealth v. Mangello, 250 Pa. Super. 202, 206-08, 378 A.2d 897, 899-900
(1977) (court held competent a six-year old child who knew people who lie "go to jail");
Commonwealth v. Hughlett, 249 Pa. Super. 341, 346, 378 A.2d 326, 328 (1977) (12-year old
child testified that she would go to hell if she lied); Commonwealth v. Ault, 228 Pa. Super.
353, 355, 323 A.2d 33, 34 (1974) (court found nine-year old witness competent after he testi-
fied that if you lie in court "you go to jail"); Commonwealth v. Allabaugh, 162 Pa. Super.
490, 492-93, 58 A.2d 184, 185-86 (1948) (court permitted five-year old child to testify despite
her ignorance of the meaning of oath).
31. Commonwealth v. Fulton, 271 Pa. Super. 430, 432, 465 A.2d 650, 657 (1983);
Commonwealth v. Fultz, __ Pa. Super..-, -, 462 A.2d 1340, 1343 (1983); Common-
wealth v. Hart, 501 Pa. 174, 177-78, 460 A.2d 745, 747 (1983).
32. Commonwealth v. Penn, 497 Pa. 232, 241, 439 A.2d 1154, 1159 (1982); In Interest
of Lawrence J., - Pa. Super. -, - , 456 A.2d 647, 649 (1983); Commonwealth v.
Stoner, 284 Pa. Super. 364, 368, 425 A.2d 1145, 1149 (1981).
33. 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1821 (Chadbourn rev. 1976); MCCORMICK ON EVI-
DENCE § 62 (E. Cleary ed. 1984).
34. Professor McCormick maintains that:
The major reason for disqualification of [insane persons or children] to take the
stand is the judges distrust of a jury's ability to assay the words of a small child
or of a deranged person. Conceding the jury's deficiencies, the remedy of exclud-
ing such a witness, who may be the only person available who knows the facts,
seems inept and primitive. Though the tribunal is unskilled and the testimony
difficult to weigh, it is better to let the evidence come in for what it is worth,
Once any challenge to the child's competency has been posi-
tively resolved, the child must still dispel adult prejudices against
validity of children's thoughts. The most trenchant assumption main-
tains that because the child's perception of the world differs from an
adult's, a child is more likely to mesh facts with fantasy.3" A young
child is considered highly suggestible and easily influenced 36 and
thus more likely to fabricate.37
After all the doubts and questions concerning the child's testi-
monial competency are quieted, a grim reality remains. The child,
who has been sexually victimized, must submit to a second victimi-
zation by the judicial system.
III. The Sexually Victimized Child
Once the court accepts the child as a competent witness, the
most arduous task still remains. The child witness must give testi-
mony effectively and accurately.38 To understand how sexual victimi-
zation affects a child's credibility, it is essential to understand the
crime of sexual abuse.
Sexual victimization of children is not a new problem.39 It en-
compasses a range of behaviors between adults and children, ranging
from indecent exposure and molestation"' to incest41 and rape.4 Au-
thority figures-such as parents, step parents, paramours, other rela-
tives, or friends-most frequently perpetrate sexual offenses against
with cautionary instructions.
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 62 (E. Cleary ed. 1984).
35. Cohen & Harnick, supra note 22, at 201.
36. Meyers, Little Witnesses, 11 STUDENT LAW. 14, 16 (Sept. 1982).
37. See contra Melton, supra note 23, at 82. The author contends that "children are no
more prone to lying than adults."
38. Note, The Problems of the Child Witness, 10 Wyo. L.J. 214, 219-20 (1956).
39. Until a century ago, the use of children for the sexual gratification of adults was
accepted by almost every major civilization. As early as 300 B.C., records indicate that near
eastern countries exploited six- and seven-year old girls, employing them as temple prostitutes.
In other societies, young girls remained at the temple until they were chosen by a man willing
to pay for sexually initiating them. In ancient Egypt, young girls were often sold to become
courtesans. Similarly, ancient Greek and Roman soldiers were notorious for their exploitation
of young boys. Until recently, the Kiwai of New Guinea sodomized young males during pu-
berty rites. In China, prepubescent girls could be purchased to serve as concubines, and in
feudal Japan monks and Samurai sexually used young boys. In Victorian England, white slave
trade flourished, and young girls were shipped to the continent regularly. By 1860, young girls
were held prisoner in kiddie prostitute houses in the United States. LINEDECKER, supra note 8,
at 106-07.
40. Molestation encompasses various forms of sexual contact between an adult and a
child, short of actual intercourse. It may consist of fondling (caressing the body or genitals),
digital penetration of the vagina or anus, genital contact without penetration, or masturbation.
Sodomy may include anal or oral intercourse, or intercourse with animals. R. GEISER, HIDDEN
VICTIMS: THE SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN 13 (1979).
41. Incest is defined as sexual intercourse between a child and a related adult. S.
O'BRIEN, CHILD ABUSE: A CRYING SHAME 15 (1980).
42. S. MELE-SERNOVITZ, PARENTAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN: THE LAW AS A THERAPEU-
TIC TOOL FOR FAMILIES (1979) (copies available from the C. Henry Kempe National Center
for the Prevention and Treatment of Child Abuse and Neglect, Denver, Colorado).
children. ' a Sexually abused victims are usually female,4 whose age
at the onset of the sexual assault is, on the average three years old.4"
A. Current Statistics
It is impossible to obtain reliable statistics revealing the extent
of the problem, primarily because sexual victimization of children is
one of the most easily concealed forms of maltreatment. 4' For exam-
ple, one child endured a sexual relationship with her stepfather for a
period of four years. When the authorities finally discovered his
crime, the stepfather confessed and was imprisoned. Upon release six
months later, he resumed his sexual practice with the child, then
nine years old.47
Commentators and experts believe that any estimation of the
scope and frequency of the problem is drastically understated. 48
Nevertheless,. the American Humane Association estimates that over
55,000 incidents of sexual offenses against children occurred nation-
wide in 1982.' Statistics in Pennsylvania are equally alarming. A
1984 subcommittee report to the Pennsylvania Senate Judiciary
Committee determined that the incidence of child sexual abuse in
43. Id.
44. O'BRIEN, supra note 41, at 16. In January, 1979, Dr. Carolyn Swift testified before
a United States House of Representatives Subcommittee that data on sexually abused boys has
been ignored by a primarily male medical community.
45. SUBCOMM. ON CHILDREN'S JUSTICE, JUDICIARY COMM. TO THE PA. SENATE, RE-
PORT ON CHILDREN'S JUSTICE (Comm. Print Sept. 11, 1984) [hereinafter cited as SUBCOMM.
REPORT]. This report is based on a series of five statewide hearings conducted during the
summer of 1984 by the Judiciary Subcommittee on Children's Justice. The Subcommittee also
found the following facts: Every two minutes in the United States a child is sexually abused.
Most sexual abuse goes unreported. Only two percent of sexual molestation against preschool
children is ever reported; At least one of every five girls and one out of 11 boys in the nation
will suffer some form of sexual abuse before age 18; Child sexual exploitation involves from
300,000 to 1.2 million children each year in commercial sexual activities; Child pornography
and prostitution enterprises produce annual profits of two to three billion dollars; About 75%
of child abusers claim to have been sexually assaulted as children; According to Justice De-
partment, 70% of all prison inmates claim to have been sexually abused as children; More than
75% of child abusers are family members, friends, or neighbors; The average length of an
incestuous relationship is three years; Between two to five million American women have suf-
fered incest. Nineteen percent of all American women and nine percent of all men were sexu-
ally victimized as children.
46. It has been estimated that 65,000 cases - or as many as 98,000 children - were
reported addressing sexual maltreatment of children nationwide in 1982. The National Center
on Child Abuse and Neglect notes that both researchers and practitioners perceive this as a
gross underestimate. Statistics compiled by THE NATIONAL CENTER ON CHILD ABUSE AND
NEGLECT, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, CHILDREN'S BUREAU, WASHINGTON,
D.C. (1984) [hereinafter referred to as NCCANJ.
47. J. MACDONALD, RAPE OFFENDERS AND THEIR VICTIMS 115 (1971).
48. GEISER, supra note 40, at 8-9. See supra note 46.
49. Statistics compiled by THE AMERICAN HUMANE ASSOCIATION, DENVER, COLO-
RADO, available as of Sept., 1984, indicate the following:
the State has reached crisis proportions." In 1982, substantiated re-
ports of sexual abuse against Pennsylvania children increased
twenty-eight percent.51 This increase in reports further reflects a
thirty-eight percent increase in episodes of indecent assault5 and a
forty-four percent increase in incidents of involuntary deviate sexual
intercourse.53 In 1983, 2,629 instances of sexual child abuse in Penn-
sylvania represented a thirty-two percent increase from the previous
year. 4 Finally, indecent assaults against Pennsylvania children be-
(I) Estimated Number of Sexual Maltreatment
Victims in U.S. Reported to Child Protective Services
Year
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
Total #
of victims 7,559 11,617 12,257 27,247 37,366 37,441 56,607
% male
victims 15% 14% 13% 14% 16% 16% 17%
% female
victims 85% 86% 87% 86% 84% 84% 83%
% male
perpetrators 79% 81% 79% 79% 80% 78% 78%
% female
perpetrators 21% 19% 21% 21% 20% 22% 22%
Estimates are based on the following:
# states in
data base 27 28 27 25 28 23 20
% of child
population
of U.S. 27% 36% 43% 42% 43% 47% 40%
(i1) Estimated Number of Incest Victims in
U.S. Reported to Child Protective Services*
1979 1980 1981 1982
Total number of victims 29,097 26,295 35,564 47,797
Male victims 3,770 3,144 4,633 6,822
Female victims 25,328 23,153 30,934 40,974
Victims 5 years of age and younger 3,932 3,939 5,848 9,169
*Incest victims are defined as victims of sexual maltreatment where at least one perpetrator
was a parent (natural, step, adoptive, foster, or unspecified parent) or other relative (sibling,
grandparent, other relative, or unspecified relative).
Estimates are based on the following:
1979 1980 1981 1982
of states in data base 27 28 26 24
% of child population of'U.S. 50.5% 54.5% 48.5% 42.0%
50. SUBCOMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 45, at 1.
51. OFFICE OF CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES, PA. DEPT. OF PUBLIC WELFARE,
CHILD ABUSE REPORT 4 (1982).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. OFFICE OF CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES, PA. DEPT. OF PUBLIC WELFARE,
CHILD ABUSE REPORT 5 (1983).
tween ages fifteen and seventeen increased one hundred percent.55
B. Criminal Prosecution of the Sex Offenders
In Pennsylvania criminal court proceedings the alleged perpe-
trator is charged under the crimes code for specific statutory of-
fenses.50 The Commonwealth must prove that the defendant is guilty
55. Id.
56. These statutory offenses are found beginning at 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 9 3101
(Purdon 1983), which contains pertinent definitions:
Deviate sexual intercourse is defined as sexual intercourse per os or per
anus between human beings who are not husband and wife, and any form of
sexual intercourse with an animal.
Indecent contact refers to any touching of the sexual or other intimate
parts of the person for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire, in
either person.
In addition to its ordinary meaning, sexual intercourse includes inter-
course per os or per anus, with some penetration however slight; emission is
not required.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3121 (1982) defines rape as sexual intercourse with another person not
one's spouse by forcible compulsion, by threat of forcible compulsion that would prevent resis-
tence by a person of reasonable resolution or against one who is unconscious or so mentally
deficient that such person is incapable of consent.
Rape is punishable as a first degree felony. A person who is 18 years of age or older
commits statutory rape, a felony of the second degree, when he engages in sexual intercourse
with another person not his spouse who is less than 14 years of age. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
3122 (Purdon 1983). The statutory provisions at 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3123, 3124
(Purdon 1983) address deviate sexual intercourse. The involuntary deviate sexual intercourse
provision contains much the same language as the provision on rape and is also punishable as a
first degree felony. Voluntary deviate sexual intercourse results in a commission of a misde-
meanor of the second degree.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3126 (Purdon 1983), proscribing indecent assault, provides in
pertinent part:
A person who has indecent contact with another not his spouse, or causes
such other to have indecent contact with him is guilty of indecent assault, a
misdemeanor of the second degree, if:
(1) He does so without the consent of the other person;
(2) He knows that the other person suffers from a mental disease or defect
which renders him or her incapable of appraising the nature of his or her
conduct;
(3) He knows that the other person is unaware that an indecent contact is
being committed;
(4) He has substantially impaired the other person's power to appraise or
control his or her conduct, by administering or employing without the knowledge
of the other drugs, intoxicants or other means for the purpose of preventing re-
sistance; or
(5) The other person is in custody of law or detained in a hospital or other
institution and the actor has supervisory or disciplinary authority over him.
Similarly, a person commits a misdemeanor of the second degree if, for the purpose of arous-
ing or gratifying sexual desires of himself or of any person other than his spouse, he exposes
his genitals under circumstances in which he knows his conduct is likely to cause affront or
alarm. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3127 (Purdon 1983).
A charge of incestuous sexual conduct is brought under 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4302
(Purdon 1983), which proscribes marriage, cohabitation, or sexual intercourse with an ancestor
or descendant, brother or sister of whole or half blood or an uncle, aunt, niece, nephew of the
whole blood.
Additionally, the defendant in a child sex offense proceeding may be charged under 18
PA. CONS. STAT. § 6301 (Purdon 1983) which proscribes conduct that corrupts or tends to
corrupt the morals of any minor less than 18 years of age or who aids, abets entices, or
encourages such minor in the commission of any crime.
beyond a reasonable doubt 7 Since sexual assault against a child
typically takes place in seclusion, the child victim5" is the only wit-
ness to the crime.5 9 Because of the duration and nature of the sexual
contact,60 prosecutors must often contend with a dearth of physical
evidence. Consequently, the child's testimony may afford the only
evidence by which to obtain a conviction in some criminal cases.
6 1
Often, the already traumatized child retreats into silence. The
perpetrator may have extracted a promise of secrecy by using coer-
cion, threats against the child or the child's loved ones, subtle per-
suasion, or bribes.6" Such coercion has powerful force: the child vic-
tim becomes confused, guilt-ridden, and terrified of losing the
affection of people who comprise his entire world. Additionally, the
mystique surrounding sex often causes the child to fear that he will
not be believed or will be deemed responsible for the sexual inci-
dent.6 3 The child may not fully comprehend that his tormentor's be-
havior is deviant. Finally, the child must confront societal myths and
assumptions associated with psychosocial development and sex of-
fenses. Some of the most formidable assumptions include the belief
that a child's testimony in sex offense cases is inherently suspect,
6 4
the belief that a child fantasizes about sexual activity, and the belief
that a child is particularly curious about sex.6 5
57. Commonwealth v. Gardner, 282 Pa. 458, 462, - A.2d - (1925); Common-
wealth v. Donough, 377 Pa. 46, 51-52, (1954) ("reasonable doubt is doubt which must fairly
arise out of the evidence and restrain a reasonable man from acting in a matter of importance
to himself").
58. "Child victim denotes a child who is involved or says he's involved in a sex offense."
Libiai, Protection of the Child Victim of a Sexual Offense in the Criminal Justice System, 15
WAYNE L. REV. 977, 981 (1969).
59. Meyer, supra note 36, at 14.
60. Wench, The Case Against the Child Sexual Abuser, 86 CASE & COMMENT 3, 3
(Sept.-Oct. 1981).
61. Interview with official from Dauphin County Deputy District Attorney office, (Sept.
24, 1984); Telephone interview with official from Luzerne County Assistant District Attorney
office (Sept. 18, 1984).
62. SEXUAL ASSAULT OF CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS 85-98 (A.W. Burgess ed.
1978). The authors describe an "accessory to sex syndrome" as a trauma in which young
victims are coerced into sexual activity with a person because of his authority or age. The
victims are incapable of consenting because of their underdeveloped cognitive and personality
levels. Emotional reactions result from the coercion as well as from the pressure placed on the
child to maintain secrecy. The child feels the burden of this pressure as fear.
63. Id.
64. But see People v. Thomas, 20 Cal. 3d 457, 466, 573 P.2d 433, 440, 143 Cal. Rptr.
215, 222 (1968) ("improper to assume that the testimony of all children in sex cases is inher-
ently suspect").
One commentator suggest that although children are suggestible to overt and covert influ-
ences, they are no more susceptible than adults. Additionally, while children are prone to
fantasize, these fantasies are based on their daily experiences. Since knowledge is an essential
basis for fantasy, children are unlikely to fantasize about sex. Additionally, children's fantasies
involve play situations, and are unlikely to use fantasy as a serious method of communication.
If a child's description of events seems fanciful, it is because he lacks the skills to articulate his
experiences. Lloyd, Corroboration of Sexual Victimization of Children, in CHILD SEXUAL
ABUSE AND THE LAW, 103, 105-06 (J. Buckley ed. 1982).
65. id.
C. The Second Victimization
When a child is sexually victimized, society is confronted with
the unpalatable fact that the safeguards developed to protect the
most vulnerable of its members do not always work."0 Yet despite
the attention contemporary society pays to the emerging problem of
child abuse, it has refused to and failed to deal with the problem of
the child victim as a witness in the criminal prosecution of child sex
offenses. The child victim must endure countless interrogations by an
array of strangers-social workers, police, law clerks, district attor-
neys, defense counsel, and judges.67 The criminal proceedings tran-
spire in an adult courtroom in the presence of people unfamiliar to
the child. Within this intimidating setting, the child must attempt to
explain confusing events in adult language, while facing the alleged
perpetrator. This testimony, which forces the child to publicly reveal
the details of the sexual contact, . often exacerbates his psycho-
logical trauma and guilt.8
The news media's startling disclosures of sexual child abuse
have generated a phenomenal reaction nationwide. Pennsylvania has
responded by introducing legislation designed to protect the child
from the second victimization which often occurs in court.
IV. The Remedy - Pennsylvania Senate Bill 1361
A. Statutory Provisions
The Pennsylvania Senate Subcommittee on Children's Justice
has determined that the Commonwealth's children do not have equal
access to justice in a criminal legal system geared toward adults.69 In
order to remedy this inequity, the Subcommittee has recommended
the enactment of Senate Bill 1361, popularly known as the Greenleaf
Bill."0 This legislation addresses several of the major obstacles con-
66. DeFrancis, Protecting the Child Victim of Sex Crimes Committed by Adults 35
FED. PROBATION Q. 15 (Sept. 1971).
67. See supra note 61. See generally LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN (Horowitz & Da-
vidson eds. 1984).
68. Note, Parent-Child Incest: Proof at Trial Without Testimony in Court, 15 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 131, 132 (Fall, 1981).
69. SUBCOMM. REPORT, supra note 45, at 1.
70. S. 1361, 168th SESS. PA. GEN. ASSEMBLY (1984) [hereinafter referred to as S. 1361
or the Greenleaf Bill]. The Bill reads in pertinent part:
§ 6374. Videotaped depositions.
In any prosecution involving a child victims or witness, the court, on its own
motion or the motion of the child victim or witness, the child's attorney or the
attorney for the Commonwealth, for good cause shown, may order the taking of
a videotaped deposition of the victim or witness which shall be used at any pre-
liminary hearing, pretrial proceeding and at the trial in lieu of the testimony of
the child. The depositions shall be taken before the court in chambers or in the
judge's chambers or in a special facility designed for taking the depositions of
children in the presence of the district attorney, the defendant, and the defen-
dant's attorney. At the request of the child, the child's parent or guardian or the
fronting the child victim of a sexual offense when he must also ap-
pear as a prosecution witness.7" The Subcommittee readily accepts
the proposition that "in person" testimony at trial is most desirable
because of the personal impact upon the jury.72 The legislation, how-
ever, accommodates the needs of vulnerable children whose emo-
tional health may be compromised by the ordeal of testifying in
court.
The Greenleaf Bill's provisions include, inter alia7 3 use of the
child's videotaped deposition71 in lieu of testimony at trial75 as well
district attorney, the court shall exclude all persons not officers of the court,
appointed child advocates, family members of the child or the defendant or
others deemed by the court to be supportive of them, or otherwise required to
attend. The court shall permit the defendant to observe and hear the testimony
of the child in person but shall ensure that the child cannot hear or see the
defendant. Examination and cross-examination of the child shall proceed in the
same manner as permitted at trial.
§ 6375. Testimony of child.
(A) Methods of Taking Testimony.-In any prosecution involving a child
victim or witness, where a videotaped deposition has not been taken under sec-
tion 6374 (relating to videotaped depositions), the child victim or child witness
shall testify in open court or the child's testimony shall be taken as provided in
subsection (B).
(B) Closed Circuit Television.-The court may, on the motion of the attor-
ney for the child victim or witness, order that the testimony of the child be taken
in a room other than the courtroom and be televised by closed circuit equipment
in the courtroom to be viewed by the court and the finder of fact in the proceed-
ing. Only the attorneys for the defendant and for the Commonwealth, persons
necessary to operate the equipment, and any person whose presence would con-
tribute to the welfare and well-being of the child, including persons designated
under section 6372 (relating to rights and services), may be present in the room
with the child during his testimony. Only the attorneys may question the child.
The persons operating the equipment shall be confined to an adjacent room or
behind a screen or mirror that permits them to see and hear the child during the
testimony, but does not permit the child to see or hear them. The court shall
permit the defendant to observe and hear the testimony of the child in person
but shall ensure that the child cannot hear or see the defendant.
(C) Effect of Order.-lf the court orders the testimony of a child to be
taken under subsection (B), the child may not be required to testify in court at
the proceeding for which the testimony was taken.
71. The remaining focus of this comment is limited to discussion of the application of
the Greenleaf Bill to the child victim of a sex offense who must appear as a witness for the
prosecution. The Bill itself also includes child witnesses or victims within its ambit.
72. SUBCOMM. REPORT, supra note 45, at 2.
73. The Greenleaf Bill also includes provisions for the designation of court advocates to
work on behalf of children involved in criminal proceedings as witnesses or victims (§ 6372); a
statement on the duty of the court and district attorney to ensure a speedy trial (§ 6373); a
provision addressing the use of the child's out of court statements describing sexual contact (§
6376); the use of anatomically correct dolls (§ 6377) and a proscription on the press from
revealing the name of the child victim in cases of physical or sexual abuse.
74. S. 1361, supra note 73, at § 6374. The current provisions under Pennsylvania law
regarding the videotaping of testimony are:
PA. R. CRIM. P. 9015-Preservation of Testimony After Institution of Criminal
Proceedings
(a) At any time after the institution of a criminal proceeding, upon motion
of any party, and after notice and hearing, the court may order the taking and
preserving of the testimony of any witness who may be unavailable for trial or
for any other proceeding, or when due to exceptional circumstances, it is in the
interests of justice that the witness' testimony be preserved.
as the option to testify via closed circuit television.76 The child's
videotaped deposition may be taken before the court in its chambers,
in the judge's chambers, or in a special facility designed for the tak-
ing of depositions of children. 7 The district attorney, the defense
counsel, and the defendant are present at the taping and the child is
examined and cross-examined in the same manner as permitted at
trial. 8 Similarly, when the child testifies during a trial via closed
circuit television, the child is taken to a room other than the court-
room, and the testimony is relayed via closed circuit equipment into
the courtroom to be viewed by the court and the finder of fact.
Cameramen are secluded behind screens or mirrors.79
While the express intent of the Greenleaf Bill80 focuses on the
(b) The court shall state on the record the grounds on which the order is
based.
(c) The court's order shall specify the time and place for the taking of the
testimony, shall specify the manner in which the testimony shall be recorded and
preserved, and shall establish procedures for custody of the recorded testimony.
(d) The testimony shall be taken before the court in the presence of the
parties and their attorneys, unless presence is waived.
(e) Nothing in this rule shall preclude the taking and preserving of testi-
mony upon the express written consent of the parties. Such consent shall be filed
of record.
Note: Adopted November 8, 1982, effective January 1, 1983.
Comment: This rule is intended to provide the means by which testimony of
a potentially unavailable witness may be preserved for use at a subsequent stage
in the criminal proceedings.
"May be unavailable," as used in this rule, is intended to include situations
in which the court has reason to believe that the witness will be unable to be
present or to testify at trial or other proceeding, such as when the witness is
dying, or will be out of the jurisdiction and therefore cannot be effectively served
with a subpoena, or may become incompetent to testify for any legally sufficient
reason.
The means by which the testimony is recorded and preserved is within the
discretion of the court and may include the use of electronic or photographic
techniques such as videotape. Ordinarily, when ordering preservation of testi-
mony, the court should consider that the proceeding be, as nearly as possible,
adversarial, affording the parties full opportunity to examine and cross-examine
the witness.
The procedure for obtaining videotaped depositions in a Civil Procedure in Pennsylvania can
be found in PA. R. Civ. P. 4017.1.
75. Depositions serve either of two purposes: depositions to preserve evidence and dis-
covery depositions. Since the focus of this comment concerns criminal proceedings, the term
deposition used herein refers only to depositions used to preserve evidence. See generally, Mc-
CORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 3 (E. Cleary ed. 1984). "The Crime Control Act of 1970 provides
for taking depositions primarily for the preservation of the evidence of the witness (for future
use as evidence) and not for the purpose of discovery of facts." See, e.g., United States v.
Singleton, 460 F.2d 1148 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 984 (1973); People v.
Feigleman, 65 Cal. App. 319, 223 P. 579 (1924); FED. R. CRIM. P. 15.
One commentator discusses the psychological harm to a child witness during a discovery
deposition. See Note, The New Criminal Deposition Statute in Ohio - Help or Hinderance
to Justice? 19 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 279 (1968).
76. S. 1361, supra note 70 at § 6375.
77. Id. at § 6374.
78. Id.
79. Id. at § 6375.
80. Id. at § 6371. The provision discussing legislative intent reads as follows:
In order to promote the best interests of the children of this Common-
prevention of additional psychological trauma to child victims or wit-
nesses, prevention of such trauma necessarily leads to an enhanced
probative value of the child's testimony."a A child that is terrified
into silence or near silence cannot be expected to provide the finder
of fact with credible evidence. Nevertheless, the Commonwealth's
compelling interest in protecting children and its substantial interest
in increasing probative value of testimonial evidence must be bal-
anced against the protections that are guaranteed the accused.
Such a balancing process generally occurs within the context of
a constitutional challenge on appeal. Accordingly, the validity of the
Greenleaf Bill must be assessed in light of its unevitable source of
challenge: a sixth amendment right of confrontation claim.
B. Sixth Amendment Challenges - The Right to Confront
Witnesses
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has a compelling interest
in protecting sexually victimized children who appear as witnesses in
the prosecution of sexual offenses.82 The Greenleaf Bill promotes this
interest, while safeguarding the fundamental, constitutionally pro-
tected rights of the accused. Nevertheless, constitutional challenges
to this legislation are likely.8 3
The sixth amendment of the United States Constitution 84 guar-
antees to the accused, among other things, 85 the right to confront
wealth, and in recognition of the necessity of affording to children who are wit-
nesses to or victims of crime additional consideration and different treatment
than that usually required by adults, the General Assembly declares its intent, in
this subchapter, to provide these children with additional rights and protections
during their involvement with the criminal justice system. The General Assem-
bly urges the news media to use restraint in revealing the identity of children
who are victims of or witnesses to crimes, especially in sensitive cases.
81. See generally, Melton, supra note 23.
82. Cruz v. Commonwealth Dep't of Public Welfare, - Pa. Commw. -, 472
A.2d 725 (1984). The court stated that the Commonwealth had a paramount interest in un-
covering child abuse and protecting past and potential abuse victims. Id. at -, 472 A.2d at
728.
83. Hearings on S. 1361 Before the Subcomm. on Children's Justice'of the Pa. Senate
Comm. on Judiciary, 168th Sess. Pa. Gen. Assembly (July 10, 1984) (statement of Max Le-
vine on behalf of the American Civil Liberties Union). Mr. Levine's statement in pertinent
part contends that:
Our principle concern, however, is with § 6374, the videotaping of deposi-
tions. here we are taking away the accused's right to a fair and public trial--one
of the basic rights afforded by the Constitution for those accused of a crime (6th
Amendment). ACLU has always been a supporter of the right to face one's
accuser, in open court, where the eyes and ears of the media and the public serve
to prevent the procedure from becoming a "star chamber." The confrontation
clause states: 'In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . ..
to be confronted with the witnesses against him.'
84. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be con-
fronted with witnesses against him." U.S. CONST. amend VI.
85. The sixth amendment embraces other rights in addition to the right of confronta-
tion. Of particular importance is the right to an open public trial. Pursuant to the Greenleaf
Bill, a child's testimony initially may be taken under conditions of limited public access. How-
witnesses against him. The guarantee is binding on the states
through the fourteenth amendment.8" Likewise, the Pennsylvania
Constitution contains a similar provision." Historically, the primary
objective of the sixth amendment was to prevent trials by ex parte
affidavits and depositions, in lieu of personal testimony and cross-
examination.8 8 The protection was designed to ensure that the ac-
ever, this testimony is eventually transmitted electronically to the open court. Under these
circumstances, the Greenleaf Bill does not appear violative of the right to an open trial.
However, to rebut such an argument, Pennsylvania has strong precedent upholding the
constitutional validity of a similar procedure-removal of spectators during the testimony of
sexually victimized witnesses. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court specifically addressed this is-
sue in Commonwealth v. Knight, 469 Pa. 57, 364 A.2d 902 (1976). In that case, a 13-year old
boy witnessed the strangulation of the defendant's mother and six- year old stepsister. At the
time of trial, the young boy remained emotionally disturbed as a result of the experience. In
order to protect the young witness from further emotional distress, the lower court excluded
spectators from the courtroom during his testimony. In upholding the exclusionary order, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that the defendant was not deprived of his constitutionally
protected right to a public trial. Noting that this right was not absolute, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court stated that the right to a public trial must be considered in relation to other
important interests, and after an assessment of the circumstances and the necessity of such
action, the trial court may issue an exclusionary order designed to effectuate protection of
important interests without infringing upon the accused right to a public trial. Furthermore,
the supreme court found that the impact upon the rights of the accused is easily controlled by
limiting the scope and duration of the exclusionary order. While the trial court cannot exclude
the entire public for the entire duration of the trial, it may exclude a specific class for the
entire duration. It may also exclude the entire public for a limited period of time, for example,
during a child's testimony.
Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Stevens, 237 Pa. Super. 457, 352 A.2d 509 (1975), the
Pennsylvania Superior Court sustained the trial court's order to clear the courtroom of specta-
tors during the testimony of a 3 1-year old rape victim. In finding that the accused's right to a
public trial is not without limitations, the Pennsylvania Superior Court acknowledged that the
sensibilities of a rape victim forced to publicly relive her experience was a cognizable and
appropriate state interest. As in Knight, the exclusion of spectators was limited to the duration
of the victim's testimony. Clearly, the Commonwealth's interest in protecting young witnesses
and victims from further psychological trauma is equally or even more compelling than its
interest in protecting adult rape victims.
While these two cases offer strong support for constitutional validity of limited courtroom
closure during the testimony of a child, a 1983 Pennsylvania Supreme Court case must be
distinguished. In Commonwealth v. Contakos, 492 Pa. 465, 453 A.2d 578 (1982), Justice Fla-
herty's plurality opinion held that closure of a first-degree murder trial during the testimony of
an adult witness violated the state constitution's mandate of an open trial. The court discussed
at length the infamous trial of William Penn in 1670 as a basis for its holding. The court
maintained that these memories were of crucial importance to Penn as he drafted the Frame
of Government indicating that all courts shall be open.
Although interesting from a historical perspective, the Contakos court's reasoning is con-
fusing and fails to address the case on its merits. Historical data does not support the conclu-
sion that the public was excluded from Penn's trial. Exclusion of the public for a limited period
of time to protect the safety of the testifying witness was the issue before the Contakos court.
This plurality opinion offers dubious precedential value, particularly when the witness is a
child. As Justice McDermott stated in his dissent, "Fortunately, the majority has confined its
attention to the facts of this case and has not exalted the mandate into an all-encompassing
rubric that suffers no exception. For, indeed, there are exceptions as this court so plainly stated
in Commonwealth v. Knight." Commonwealth v. Contakos at 470, 453 A.2d at 583 (McDer-
mott, J., dissenting).
86. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
87. "In all criminal prosecutions the accused hath a right ... to meet the witness face
to face." PA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
88. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107 (1934); Mattox v. United States, 156
U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895). Some scholars maintain that the confrontation clause originated in
cused had an adequate opportunity to challenge the accuracy of
statements made against him and to permit the jury to observe the
demeanor of the witness while testifying.89
Although the right of confrontation is fundamental,90 it is not
absolute. 91 The right of confrontation may yield to other legitimate
concerns in a criminal trial proceeding.92 Although constitutional
protection is beneficial and valuable to the accused, it may give way
to overriding public policy considerations or necessities of the case.9 3
In Snyder v. Massachusetts,94 Justice Cardozo recognized limita-
tions on the right of confrontation. As he demurred: "nor has the
privilege of confrontation at any time been without its exceptions
... .The exceptions are not even static but may be enlarged from
time to time if there is no material departure from the reason of the
response to the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh in England in 1603. Raleigh was convicted and
executed for treason. His conviction was based upon ex parte affidavits. He had no opportunity
to call witnesses or cross examine witnesses against him. See F. HELLER, THE SIXTH AMEND-
MENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 104-06 (1969). See generally California
v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 174-79 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
89. See Govt. of Virgin Islands v. Aquino, 378 F.2d 540, 548 (3d Cir. 1967), where the
court noted:
Demeanor is of the utmost importance in the determination of the credibil-
ity of a witness. The innumerable telltale indications which fall from a witness
during the course of his examination are often much more of an indication to
judge or jury of his credibility and the reliability of his evidence than is the
literal meaning of his words. Even beyond the precise words themselves lies the
unexpressed indication of his alignment with one side or the other in the trial. It
is indeed rarely that a cross-examiner succeeds in compelling a witness to retract
testimony which is harmful to his client, but it is not infrequently that he leads a
hostile witness to reveal by his demeanor-his tone of voice, the evidence of fear
which grips him at the height of cross-examination, or even his defiance-that
his evidence is not to be accepted as true, either because of partiality or
overzealousness or inaccuracy, as well as outright untruthfulness. The demeanor
of a witness, as Judge Frank said, is "wordless language."
90. Snyder v. Mass., 291 U.S. at 106-07.
91. Commonwealth v. Stasko, 471 Pa. 373, 379, 370 A.2d 350, 353 (1977); Common-
wealth v. McCloud, 457 Pa. 310, 312, 322 A.2d 653, 655 (1974).
92. Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972).
93. See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. at 243-44, where the Court pointed out
that:
A technical adherence to the letter of a constitutional provision may occasionally
be carried farther than is necessary to the just protection of the accused, and
farther than the safety of the public will warrant. For instance, there could be
nothing more directly contrary to the letter of the provision in question than the
admission of dying declarations. They are rarely made in the presence of the
accused; they are made without any opportunity for examination or cross-exami-
nation; nor is the witness brought face to face with the jury; yet from time im-
memorial they have been treated as competent testimony, and no one would
have the hardihood at this day to question their admissibility. They are admitted
not in conformity with any general rule regarding the admission of testimony,
but as an exception to such rules, simply from the necessities of the case, and to
prevent a manifest failure of justice.
Technically, the confrontation clause discussion in Mattox was not part of the holding. The
defendant offered the dying declaration into evidence. However, the court has treated this
dictum as authority for the use of dying declarations against the defendant.
94. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934).
general rule." 5
In order to determine whether the right of confrontation mili-
tates against the use of videotaped depositions or closed circuit testi-
mony in a criminal proceeding, the essential components of that
right must be determined. Unfortunately, this is not an area of
clearly settled law. Some recent court decisions suggest that the
right to cross-examine witnesses comprises the essence of the con-
frontation clause.96 Other decisions focus on the relationship between
the hearsay rule 97 and the confrontation clause, relying on the evi-
dentiary rule to determine the scope of the constitutional provi-
sion."98 Still other scholars and commentators maintain that the
availability of the witness is the essential component of the confron-
tation clause.99
In the seminal case of California v. Green,100 Justice White
enunciated three factors underlying the right of confrontation: the
administration of the oath to impress upon the witness the solemnity
of the testimony; the use of cross-examination as an effective device
for determining truth; and the opportunity for the jury to observe the
demeanor of the witness to aid its assessment of his credibility. 101
The Accommodations afforded the child witness under the
Greenleaf Bill substantially comply with the three criteria articu-
95. Snyder v. Mass., 291 U.S. at 107. See also Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64
(1980); Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970); United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346 (8th
Cir., 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977).
96. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973) ("The right of cross-examination is
• . . implicit in the constitutional right of confrontation and helps assure the accuracy of the
truth determining process."); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970). See Bruton v. United
States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965); Pointer v. Texas, 380
U.S. 400 (1965). But cf. Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968) (although prior testimony at a
preliminary hearing had been subject to cross examination, it was deemed violative of a con-
frontation right where a good faith effort to obtain the witness for trial was not demonstrated);
Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895) (dying declaration that was not subjected to
cross examination deemed admissible).
97. Professor McCormick defines hearsay by employing the definition in the Federal
Rules of Evidence: "Hearsay is a statement other than one made by the declarant while testi-
fying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted."
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 246 (E. Cleary ed. 1984); FED. R. EVID. 801. See Mattox v.
United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895). But see Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123
(1968); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). In all
these cases certain evidence was arguably admissible under a hearsay exception but the court
held that its admission into evidence would violate the confrontation clause.
98. But see California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155 (1970), where the Court noted:
While it may readily be conceded that hearsay rules and the Confrontation
Clause are generally designed to protect similar values, it is quite a different
thing to suggest that the overlap is complete and that the Confrontation Clause
is nothing more or less than a codification of the rules of hearsay and their
exceptions as they existed historically at common law. Our decisions have never
established such a congruence.
99. Id. at 174 (Harlan, J., concurring) ("Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amend-
ment reaches no farther than to require the prosecution to produce any available witness
whose declarations it seeks to use in a criminal trial.") (emphasis in original).
100. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
101. Id. at 158.
lated by Justice White. Under either the videotaped deposition or the
closed circuit television options, the witness would be sworn. In both
situations, the defendant and his counsel would be present, and the
witness would be subject to full cross-examination. Also, in both sit-
uations, the jury would be able to observe the demeanor of the wit-
ness under direct as well as cross-examination." 2
There is precedent in Pennsylvania supporting the use of elec-
tronic testimony in criminal proceedings. Pennsylvania Rule of
Criminal Procedure 9015103 provides for the preservation of testi-
mony after the institution of criminal proceedings and the official
comment to Rule 9015 contemplates electronic or photographic tech-
niques, such as videotaping, as acceptable means of preserving
testimony.10 "
In Commonwealth v. Stasko,'0 ' the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held that the trial court properly allowed into evidence a vide-
otaped deposition of an adult eyewitness to a murder after the trial
court concluded that the emotional strain of testifying at trial might
aggravate the eyewitness' underlying physical ailment. In upholding
the conviction, the Stasko court necessarily accepted the premise
that the right to confrontation at trial is not absolute, ". . . and en-
dorsed the analysis of California v. Green."""6 By substantially com-
plying with the criteria articulated in California v. Green, the su-
preme court explained courts would adequately safeguard the
defendant's right of confrontation.107
But Pennsylvania authority on this issue is scarce mainly be-
cause of the relatively recent emergence of videotaped or closed cir-
cuit testimony. Therefore, the manner in which other jurisdictions
have addressed constitutional challenges to electronic confrontation
warrants examination. In Kansas City v. McCoy,'0 8 the supreme
court of Missouri upheld the use of closed circuit television for ex-
amining an absent expert witness. The court did not find the proce-
dure violative of the confrontation clause, emphasizing instead the
importance of recognizing new methods of communication that allow
clear, accurate voice and image projection under sufficient controls
to ensure the integrity of the projection. 1 9 Similarly, in State v.
Melendez," 0 the Arizona Court of Appeals sustained the use of vide-
102. S. 1361 supra note 73, at §§ 6374, 6375.
103. See supra note 77.
104. Id.
105. 471 Pa. 373, 370 A.2d 350.
106. Id. at 379, 370 A.2d at 353.
107. Id.
108. Kansas City v. McCoy, 525 S.W.2d 336 (Mo. 1975) (en banc).
109. Id. at 339.
110. 135 Ariz. 390, 661 P.2d 654 (1982). See also People v. Moran, 39 Cal, App. 3d
398, 410, 114 Cal. Rptr. 413, 420 (1974) (videotaped testimony of chief witness for the prose-
otaped testimony of a six-year old sexual assault victim in lieu of
actual testimony at trial. The trial court had entered the videotaped
testimony into evidence based on a clinical psychologist's testimony
that the child was likely to become noncommunicative if called to
testify before a jury. Noting that the defendant and his counsel were
present at the videotaping and afforded an opportunity to cross-ex-
amine the child witness, the court held that the use of the videotape
did not deny the defendant's constitutional right of confrontation.'11
In contrast to this authority, a few recent court decisions'
1 2
maintain that the confrontation clause encompasses the right to
physical presence of the accused and his face-to-face confrontation
with the witness. Under their analysis, any procedure impeding this
face-to-face meeting violates the accused's constitutional rights. Al-
though some of the earlier cases"' do use the term "face-to-face" as
well, the technological context in which these cases (all predating
1935) were decided may distort the significance of this phrase. At
the time legal scholars and practitioners could not have conceived of
an alternative to the witness' physical presence in the courtroom
which would substantially fulfill the underlying purposes of the con-
frontation clause. Thus, at least in these pretelevision era cases, it is
far from conclusive that "face-to-face" meant ensuring "... a mere
." "physical looking upon" the witness." 4 The more reasonable
view would acknowledge that the "face-to-face" requirement merely
comported with the only means available at the time, to safeguard
cution "is sufficiently similar to live testimony to permit the jury to properly perform its func-
tion"); Hutchins v. State, 286 So. 2d 244 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973) (videotaped testimony of
expert witness, a laboratory technician, properly admitted into evidence); State v. Hewett, 86
Wash. 2d 487, 490-94, 545 P.2d 1201, 1203-05 (1976) (en banc) (permitting the admission of
the videotaped testimony by robbery victim. The court stated that the accused's sixth amend-
ment rights were not violated when the victim who was unavailable for trial had been sworn at
the videotaping. In addition, the accused had been present and had had the opportunity to
cross-examine the victim. Also, the tape was properly authenticated.).
11l. State v. Melendez, 135 Ariz. at 398, 661 P.2d at 656-57.
112. United States v. Benfield, 593 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1979); Herbert v. Superior Court,
117 Cal. App. 3d 661, 172 Cal. Rptr. 850 (1981) (at the trial court's direction the defendant
was seated so he could hear but not see the five-year old victim of his alleged crime. Court of
appeals held that under these circumstances, the defendant's right to confrontation had been
abridged).
113. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 106 (1934); Kirby v. United States, 174
U.S. 47, 55 (1899); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895). See also PA. CONST.
art. I, § 9 (using the language: "to meet the witness face to face." Any proposed interpretation
of the phrase "face to face" applies to its use in the Pennsylvania constitution).
114. As Professor Wigmore explains:
The main and essential purpose of confrontation is to secure for the oppo-
nent the opportunity of cross-examination. The opponent demands confrontation,
not for the idle purpose of gazing upon the witness, or of being gazed upon by
him, but for the purpose of cross-examination, which cannot be had except by
the direct and personal putting of questions and obtaining immediate answers.
That this is the true and essential significance of confrontation is clear.
5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1395 (Chadbourn rev. 1974).
the confrontation rights of the accused. 115
Recent authority from the Eighth Circuit apparently reaffirm-
ing the necessity of face-to-face meeting of accused and witness can
be found in United States v. Benfield."1 6 However, the peculiar facts
of that case are readily distinguishable from sexual assault cases in-
volving children. In Benfield, the key witness for the prosecution, an
adult, testified via videotaped deposition because she claimed to be
"psychologically unavailable" for trial, yet the same witness had
granted interviews with the news media and held news conferences
before the trial. Moreover, the videotaped deposition was taken in
her hospital room at a time when she was deceived into believing the
defendant was not present. Although the witness was subject to cross
examination by counsel, the defendant himself was not physically
permitted in the room. Instead, he was allowed to observe the pro-
ceedings on a monitor. He was able to halt the proceedings by hit-




Arguably, these circumstances did not warrant use of a videotaped
deposition in the first place, nor did the procedures adequately safe-
guard the defendant's rights.
The Greenleaf Bill addresses the compelling state interest of
protecting child victims as witnesses. This legislation requires both
videotape and closed circuit testimony to be conducted in a properly
solemn setting' 18 and, more importantly, in the presence of the de-
fendant. 1 9 The Benfield court itself acknowledged that "[when] the
procedures more nearly approximate the traditional courtroom set-
ting, our approval might be forthcoming." 0 Significantly, the court
recognized that "the alleged involvement of a defendant charged
with a crime against persons could be so heinous as to excuse the
victim from facing [the defendant] while testifying," although the
conduct in this case did not reach such magnitude. a2'
The Benfield decision might be completely without significance
for the Greenleaf Bill, except for that court's apparent concern that
the witness was deceived. Although the Greenleaf Bill does not advo-
cate deceiving the child witness into believing the alleged perpetrator
is not present, it does provide that the child be unable to hear or see
115. For example, in Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895), the Su-
preme Court discussed the protections of the confrontation clause, saying, "the accused has
...opportunity ...of compelling [the witness] to stand face to face with the jury in order
that they may look upon him and judge by his demeanor upon the stand ...whether he is
worthy of belief." Id. (emphasis added).
116. 593 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1979).
117. Id. at 817.
118. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
119. Id.
120. United States v. Benfield, 593 F.2d at 821.
121. Id.
him.122 Therefore, to the extent that Benfield may stand for the pro-
position that such a requirement is constitutionally infirm, the deci-
sion must be addressed.
The Benfield court never articulated its precise concern with the
witness' false perception that the defendant was not present. It did
state, however, that "most [persons] believe that in some undefined
but real way, recollection, veracity, and communication are influ-
enced by face-to-face challenge."' 2 3 Reasoning that face-to-face con-
frontation is essential because it increases the likelihood that an un-
truthful witness will succumb, the court, however, failed to produce
empirical data to support this contention.
In fact, there is evidence that such testimony is less reliable,
especially when the witness is a child victim of a sexual offense. 2 If
the objective in mandating face-to-face confrontation of the accused
and the witness is to force the emotionally or psychologically imma-
ture witness to succumb to the presence of the defendant, then the
proponents of such a requirement will have transformed the sixth
amendment guarantee of right of confrontation into a right to intim-
idate the witness.
Such a transformation is improper, as various courts have ruled.
These decisions resoundingly uphold the tenet that the right of con-
frontation is not congruent with a right of intimidation. In United
States v. Carlson,2 " the Eighth Circuit, sitting en banc, found that a
defendant's intimidation of a witness resulted in the witness' refusal
to testify at trial. Under those circumstances the court found no vio-
lation of the sixth amendment confrontation right when later the ab-
sent witness' grand jury testimony was admitted at trial. The court
simply refused to sanction the practice of intimidating witnesses to
prevent their testimony at trial by allowing the accused to derive any
benefit from such conduct. 26 The court reached this conclusion
though the defendant's counsel never had an opportunity to cross-
examine the witness.
1 27
Other courts have affirmed this proposition. In Burkett v.
State,128 for example, the Criminal Court of Appeals of Alabama.
upheld the conviction of physical abuse despite a sixth amendment
122. S. 1361 supra note 70, at §§ 6374, 6375.
123. United States v. Benfield, 593 F.2d at 521.
124. Face-to-face confrontation with extremely vulnerable victims, such as children,
may diminish the reliability of their testimony rather than enhance it. One commentator has
observed: "The well-established 'inverted-U relationship' between arousal and performance
suggests that placing witnesses in great emotional distress would result in testimony of less
probative value." See Melton, supra note 23, at 75.
125. 547 F.2d 1346 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977).
126. Id. at 1359.
127. Id.
128. 439 So. 2d 737 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983).
challenge by the appellant that he was denied the opportunity to
confront the six-year old victim "face-to-face". The appellate court
approved of the trial court's positioning of the defendant during ex-
amination of the witness, stating:
[tihe record is clear that the appellant's proximity to the witness
caused her discomfort . . . . The possibility of the appellant in-
timidating the victim was present . . . . In order to ensure that
the witness' testimony be understandable and of some worth to
the State . . . the trial court properly treated the examination of
the victim with delicacy.'3 9
It seems clear that the constitutionally protected right of con-
frontation does not include a right to intimidate. Either testimonial
scheme provided for in the Greenleaf Bill substantially comports
with the underlying purposes of the sixth amendment guaranty. Ar-
guably one predominant reason exists for the accused to demand
such a narrow and absolute face-to-face confrontation with the child.
The accused hopes to capitalize on the inherent weaknesses of child-
hood and he relies on his presence and the system to intimidate the
child witness into silence or anxiety-produced confusion. Such a con-
cern does not rise to the level of a constitutionally protected right. If
there is any prejudice at all to the accused, it is incidental. The in-
creased reliability and probative value of the child's testimony
weighs any incidental prejudice to the accused.
Finally, it must be recognized that most courts allow special tes-
timonial procedures only upon a showing of witness unavailability. 30
This concept has been interpreted to mean that the witness cannot
be unavailable as a result of the prosecution's conduct and that the
prosecution has made a good faith attempt to obtain the witnesses'
presence at trial. 31 Recognizing unavailability as a key component
of the confrontation clause will not present insurmountable constitu-
tional problems for the Greenleaf Bill. Without specifically articulat-
ing a requirement of unavailability, but permitting alternatives to
protect the child's emotional well-being,'32 the Subcommittee eluded
to a category of psychological unavailability. Such a category based
on the compelling state interest to protect its children's psychological
health would not violate the confrontation clause.
129. Id. at 747.
130. Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1974); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149
(1970).
131. Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968).
132. See SUBCOMM. REPORT, supra note 45.
V. Unanswered Questions - Problems and Proposals
A. Proposed Improvements
The Greenleaf Bill is a commendable first step toward address-
ing the disparate treatment of sexually victimized children in the
Pennsylvania legal system. Nevertheless, both stylistic and substan-
tive flaws exist in the Bill. Initially, the drafters must define the
terms used in the Bill more precisely. Foremost, the Bill needs a defi-
nition of "child" to set the parameters of its applicability. While
younger children should be included in the full ambit of the Bill, it is
not clear that all persons under eighteen years warrant the maxi-
mum degree of protection. Being cognizant that line drawing can be
difficult and even dangerous, drafters should, nevertheless, tailor the
statute more carefully to its ability to meet constitutional muster.
The Bill's section on procedures also needs to be refined. Cur-
rently it provides for the physical presence of the defendant and his
counsel at videotapings or during closed circuit testimony."' 3 The
Bill also requires the court to ensure that the child witness cannot
see or hear the defendant. 1 3 The logistics necessary to achieve both
requirements may be difficult to conceptualize. Therefore, the alter-
natives available to the courts should be clearly set forth in the
Bill. 3 5 Moreover, this meticulous drafting would facilitate the
courts' compliance with the legislative mandate in a consistent, effec-
tive manner, avoiding ad hoc methods that may be constitutionally
problematic.
13 6
The most significant weakness of the Greenleaf Bill concerns its
failure to address specifically the court's requirement that a witness
be unavailable before videotaped testimony can be admitted into evi-
dence. 13 7 The section of the Greenleaf Bill providing for videotaped
133. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
134. Id.
135. During a telephone interview with Paula Fogarty, Senator Greenleaf's legislative
assistant, indicated that the Subcommittee intended to permit the use of screens or one-way
mirrors. Telephone interview with Paula Fogarty, Legislative Asst. to Sen. Greenleaf (Oct. 26,
1984). However, use of screens may raise serious constitutional questions if the defendant
cannot observe the testifying witness.
136. Additionally, once specific procedures are identified, funds should be provided to
ensure the courts' ability to conduct the proceedings according to enunciated alternatives. The
purchase of specialized equipment and even structural remodeling of courthouses may be
necessary.
137. The current Pennsylvania unavailability requirement governing admissibility of evi-
dence from a former trial is codified at 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5917 (Purdon 1982) and
states:
Notes of evidence at former trial.
Whenever any person has been examined as a witness, either for the Com-
monwealth or for the defense, in any criminal proceeding conducted in or before
a court or record, and the defendant has been present and has had an opportu-
nity to examine or cross-examine, if such witness afterwards dies, or is out of the
jurisdiction so that he cannot be effectively served with a subpoena, or if he
depositions merely enunciates a "good cause shown" requirement,138
and the closed circuit television provision does not articulate any pre-
requisites to its use at trial.139 Although the legislative history indi-
cates the drafters' preference for in-person testimony "whenever pos-
sible," '14 0 that phrase, as well as "good cause shown," must be more
clearly pinned down. Incorporating language that establishes poten-
tial psychological trauma or exacerbation of existing emotional dis-
turbances as legally sufficient bases for unavailability without dimin-
ishing the effectiveness of the Bill.
B. Other Statutory Provisions
Despite this comment's focus on the electronic testimony provi-
sions, other sections of the Greenleaf Bill are equally significant.
1. The Child Advocate.-The Greenleaf Bill provides for des-
ignation of a qualified person to act as an advocate on behalf of a
child involved in a criminal proceeding. 4" The use of child advocates
will be meaningful if they are carefully selected, well trained, and
accorded respect by the members of the bar.
2. Out-of-Court Statements.-The provision allowing greater
latitude to admit a child's out-of-court statements describing sexual
contact is another essential component of the Bill. 42 This section
will almost certainly be challenged on sixth amendment right of con-
frontation grounds. Although the scope of the confrontation clause
and the hearsay rule are not congruent,'4 3 they protect similar inter-
cannot be found, or if he becomes incompetent to testify for any legally sufficient
reason properly proven, notes of his examination shall be competent evidence
upon a subsequent trial of the same criminal issue. For the purpose of contra-
dicting a witness the testimony given by him in another or in a former proceed-
ing may be orally proved.
138. S. 1361 supra note 70, at § 6374.
139. Id. at § 6375.
140. SUBCOMM. REPORT, supra note 45, at 2. The trial court would determine whether
electronic testimony should be used at trial without having to take expert testimony on the
need for such procedures. A similar approach is taken by the state of Florida. See Washington
v. State of Florida, No. AT-430, slip op. (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. May 23, 1984) (available Sept.
II, 1984, on LEXIS, State library, Fla. file).
Additionally, the court may consider other purposes for videotaping the child's testimony.
For example, some child abuse experts feel that a videotaped deposition by the young victim
may enhance the possibilities of obtaining confessions. Videotaping also helps preserve testi-
mony. This factor may be particularly important in child sexual abuse cases because during
the interval between the crime and the trial, the child and her parents may try to forget the
experience. Interview with official from Dauphin County Deputy District Attorney (Sept. 24,
1984); Telephone Interview with official from Luzerne County Asst. District Attorney (Sept.
18, 1984); Interview with official from Cumberland County Children and Youth Services
(Sept. 10, 1984).
141. S. 1361 supra note 70, at § 6372.
142. Id. at § 6376.
143. See supra note 98.
ests and in many cases tend to bolster each other. However, in view
of the increasingly liberal hearsay exceptions in child abuse cases...
and of the Bill's overall potential to (vithstand a confrontation clause
challenge, arguments opposing this provision on these grounds are
likely to fail.
C. Future Concerns
1. First Amendment Challenges.-Inevitably, the Greenleaf
Bill will evoke strong reservations that it infringes on the public's
right of access to trials. But since the Bill does not mandate auto-
matic closure or the use of electronic testimony in all cases 145 only
by case-by-case determination, the Greenleaf Bill is not likely to be
found constitutionally infirm under a first amendment challenge. 14"
2. Educational Programs.-Because background of judges, at-
torneys, and police rarely includes child psychology and development
courses, much less the study of human behavior which perpetuates
child abuse, educational programs should be established on their be-
half. Additionally, judges should be persuaded to give effect to Penn-
sylvania's presumption of competency. Numerous witnesses before
the Senate Subcommittee hearing the Greenleaf Bill complained
that Pennsylvania trial judges rule younger children incompetent to
testify almost automatically."" The better view, and one certainly in
synchronization with the Pennsylvania statute 48 and the federal
rules on which the Pennsylvania statute is based,149 abolishes arbi-
trary competency requirements based on age. Obviously legislation
like the Greenleaf Bill can do little to resolve problems of child wit-
nesses if judges effectively foreclose children from testifying based
solely on age.
144. See Note, A Comprehensive Approach to Child Hearsay Statements in Sex Abuse
Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1745 (1983); Note, Sexual Abuse of Children-Washington's New
Hearsay Exception, 58 WASH. L. REV. 813 (1982-1983).
145. See supra notes 144-46 and accompanying text.
146. Although not perfectly analogous, the constitutional challenges that arise when the
trial judge removes spectators during the child's "in person" courtroom testimony are similar.
See supra note 88.
A recent United States Supreme Court case addresses these concerns. In Globe Newspa-
per Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982), the appellant press organization was denied
access to a rape trial during the testimony of three teenage victims pursuant to a Massachu-
setts statute that required closure of sex offense trials during the testimony of minor victims.
Although the Court held that the mandatory nature of the statute rendered it constitutionally
infirm under the first amendment, it also indicated that "[a] trial court can determine on a
case-by-case basis whether closure is necessary to protect the welfare of a minor victim."
The Greenleaf Bill provides the trial court an option of using electronic testimony, should
it determine that a minor victim or witness in that case would sustain psychological trauma if
compelled to testify in person at trial.
147. SUBCOMM. REPORT, supra note 45, at 4.
148. See supra note 15.
149. FED. R. EvID. 601.
3. Victims Under Three Years.-Even if age requirements are
abolished, very young children, typically those under the age of
three, will have difficulty relating their experiences, and some may
not be able to verbalize at all.' 50 This problem remains completely
unaddressed by the Greenleaf Bill. Tragically, the continued failure
to deal with this problem will result in the "perfect crime"-when a
perpetrator chooses a victim too small to resist and too young to un-
derstand and communicate the details of the experience at trial.
One possible remedy is the use of expert testimony and play
therapy. In play therapy children are given choices of "anatomically
correct" male and female dolls.' The way in which the child
utilizes the dolls reveals to the expert whether or not sexual abuse is
likely to have occurred. Although defense counsel is likely to object
to such testimony as hearsay, it can be argued that such behavior
during play therapy does not constitute an assertion. 52 The other
means of overcoming the inadequacies of infant witnesses is through
the testimony of expert witnesses on sexual abuse syndrome.' Al-
though a child may not yet be able to talk, he may exhibit certain
nonverbal behavior associated with children who are sexually
abused. These alternatives to a child's direct testimony should be se-
riously considered.
4. The Crimes Code.-The sections of the crimes code dealing
with sexual offenses154 must be revised. Penalties for certain crimes
must be upgraded' 55 and the possibility of new crime classifications
scrupulously evaluated. 56 Furthermore, mandatory sentencing for
the convicted perpetrator deserves serious consideration. As the Sen-
ate Subcommittee noted, initial reports indicated the efficacy of
150. See supra notes 21-29 and accompanying text.
151. See infra notes 158-59.
152. In Re Cheryl H, 153 Cal. App. 3d 1098, 200 Cal. Rptr. 789 (1984) (child's con-
duct during play therapy was nonassertive and therefore not hearsay). But see State v. Muel-
ler, 344 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa Ct. App. 1983) (testimony acted out with dolls contained hearsay
characteristics and was inadmissible). See generally State of Arizona v. Cousin, 136 Ariz.
App. 83, 664 P.2d 233 (1983); State v. Tuffree, 35 Wash. App. 243, 666 P.2d 912 (1983).
153. State v. Danielski, 350 N.W.2d 395 (Minn. App. 1984) (Expert testimony regard-
ing typical familial sexual abuse symptoms and behaviors inadmissible). But see State v. Mid-
dleton, 294 Or. 427, 657 P.2d 1215 (1982) (testimony on sexual abuse syndrome held
admissible).
154. See supra note 56.
155. For example, if a perpetrator was convicted for ramming a soft drink bottle into a
young child's vagina, he would be guilty only of a second degree misdemeanor. See 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1326 (Purdon 1983). But such an experience is as traumatic to the child
and as reprehensible to society as penile penetration and warrants penalties comparable to
those for first degree felonies like rape and deviate sexual intercourse.
156. A viable alternative would be the creation of two categories of indecent assault -
simple and aggravated. Aggravated indecent assault would include penetration by objects into
the vagina or rectum and would be classified as a first degree felony. Telephone interview with
Jayne Duncan, Dauphin County Deputy District Attorney (Oct. 26, 1984).
mandatory jail time as a deterrent to crime. 5 7 Additionally, parents
may be more willing to subject their children to the grueling ordeal
of criminal prosecution of a sex offender if they believe the resulting
penal sanctions to be more than a slap on the wrist.
In conjunction with mandatory sentencing, compulsory therapy
should be contemplated for the offender. Recidivism rates among
child sex offenders remains high. 15 8 Often the offender was, himself,
abused as a child. 59 Certainly, the Commonwealth's interest in pro-
tecting its children is promoted by compulsory therapy if when the
convict completes his sentence he does not return to the community
and commit the same crime again.
5. Conflicting Policies: Prosecution Versus Family Reunifica-
tion.-Commonwealth agencies that provide children's services need
a definitive ordering of the conflicting priorities of family reunifica-
tion or protection of the child by removal from the home in incest
cases. As the Senate Subcommitee observed, "the philosophies of the
many agencies dealing with intrafamilial sex abuse may be lagging
the new public attitudes by placing too rigid an emphasis on family
reunification at the expense of the victim's protection and best
interest."' 60
6. An Active Response.-Finally, more emphasis must be
placed on the prevention of sexual child abuse. Parents and teachers
must be educated to the signs and symptoms of abuse. They must
become aware of the importance of listening carefully to the details
of their child's or student's conversations. Parents need to create an
environment where the child feels that his experiences involving sex-
ual matters can be discussed freely. Additionally, more programs are
needed to teach the child to distinguish appropriate from inappropri-
ate physical contact. With educational programs aimed at prevention
of sexual child abuse, perhaps the need for the testimony of children
in criminal prosecutions of sex offenders will diminish.
VI. Conclusion
Children are the most defenseless members of our society. Star-
tling statistics reveal that sexual abuse of children has reached crisis
proportions, permeating even the most revered societal institutions.
157. SUBCOMM. REPORT, supra note 45, at 4.
158. See generally K. MEISELMAN, INCEST (1978). See also LINDECKER supra note 8.
159. Id.
160. SUBCOMM. REPORT, supra note 45, at 3. S. 1361 was unanimously passed by the
Senate and House last term. However, Governor Thornburgh vetoed the Bill on Dec. 26, 1984
(due to an attached rider). A substantially similar version was introduced in the Senate this
term. Currently designated S. 176 - the Bill was passed by the Senate on Feb. 6, 1985 and
sent to the House Judiciary Committee on Feb. 12, 1985.
Despite the reprehensible nature of the crime, society has failed to
take effective measures to apprehend, successfully prosecute, and re-
habilitate the offender. Instead, in order to present her testimony to
the jury, the young victim of a sex offense must endure a rigorous
ordeal that exacerbates the inherent frailties of childhood. But the
interests of justice are not served when the child is, in a sense, fur-
ther victimized by a complex prosecutorial system which does not
permit her full participation.
Pennsylvania has taken a commendable, initial step toward ad-
dressing the special needs of its children in the judicial system. The
Greenleaf Bill attempts to protect the child's right to be heard with-
out infringing on the rights of the accused. However, this single
piece of legislation is no panacea to the horrifying problem of sexual
abuse of children. Additional legislative measures, written in clear,
strong, unequivocal language, must follow Senate Bill 1361 to ensure
that all the Commonwealth's children have equal access to justice.
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